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AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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Nationalism in British Africa

by William W. Wade

1967

It was once the fashion to call Africa the continent of the future. Now both economic development and political awakening have hit Africa, particularly British Africa. The future, formerly regarded as distant, has become the present. Millions of Africans may remain politically inert and undemanding, but no one doubts that once African nationalism becomes a real force the movement will spread swiftly.

The current areas of decision are British East and Central Africa. In West Africa, the Gold Coast particularly, the Colonial Office appears to be successful in implementing its policy of "creative abdication," despite a recent setback in Nigeria.

No similar clear road lies ahead for the three East African territories—Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda—or the three Central African possessions—Southern and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Yet it is here that British African policy faces multiple dilemmas made urgent by the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya and by the April 15 election victory for Nationalist *apartheid* in the Union of South Africa. The present Union government has made clear its view of what Africa's future should be—enforced racial separation and po-

litical rule by the white minority. London is thus under pressure to devise alternative answers for that part of Africa which it continues to rule.

Like South Africa, both Southern Rhodesia and Kenya have achieved the fundamentals of modern economies through the efforts of their white settlers. They and the four other territories of the region have considerable assets and promise. Southern Rhodesia produces its own steel, has a network of secondary industries, grows tobacco, raises cattle, and furnishes coal for the booming Northern Rhodesian copper mines. Kenya's coffee and sisal plantations have thrived since the end of World War II. Tanganyika (a United Nations trust territory), Uganda and Nyasaland are also agricultural, with increasingly important production. The colonies, however, have their economic limitations. The pressure of population on the land in native reserves, erosion, the tsetse fly and lack of transportation are all obstacles to development.

But problems such as these are quickly dwarfed by the riddles of human relations when economic pursuits have to be carried out, as in Kenya today, with gun on hip.

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Mau Mau, a secret, blood-oath society, has killed and pillaged brutally. It is, however, confined to Kenya's largest tribe, the Kikuyu, numbering about one-fifth of the colony's 5.5 million African population. Although the society's avowed aim is to drive out the European, the overwhelming proportion of its victims have been fellow tribesmen.

Kikuyu home guard units have fought back effectively against the illicit Mau Mau. The British, who have moved two contingents of troops into the lightly policed territory, now find themselves in the midst of a Malaya-type guerrilla warfare. Mau Mau, however, does not appear to have a ready outside source of arms or, for that matter, external moral or ideological support.

It is difficult for an outsider to attempt to isolate the causes of the rebellion. Press dispatches from Nairobi state that European settlers refuse to place much weight on economic motives, preferring to characterize Mau Mau as an atavistic phenomenon. Yet Africans can list a number of Kikuyu grievances, both political and economic—land hunger, detribalization without compensating opportunities, instances where the white community has successfully interceded with the Colonial Office to retard African political representation.

Moreover, the Kenya government conducted a lengthy trial of an educated African, Jomo Kenyatta, on charges of being the "master mind" of Mau Mau. Kenyatta was the leader of a broadly based, legitimate Kikuyu movement, the Kenya African

Union, proscribed on June 8. He had once visited the Soviet Union. His conviction, in April, was based on evidence that he had participated in illicit Mau Mau activities, and he and five others were sentenced to seven years' hard labor. British newspapers like *The Economist* and the *Manchester Guardian* found the verdict justified but the circumstances tragic.

The British administration has little alternative except suppression of the Mau Mau uprising. If that can be accomplished it has many other plans and tasks ahead—for economic development, agricultural improvement, health, education, housing for the benefit of Kenya's Africans. A royal commission is now investigating the land problem. There appears to be a greater will in the colony for communal harmony than in previous years. The problem is to put this into effect before it is too late.

Central African Federation

While the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya seeks to drive out the European, African sentiment in Central Africa poses a problem for London because its leaders cling to the protection of the Colonial Office. This is not as paradoxical as it sounds, for the African attitude in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland represents less an affection for colonial status than hostility to the white settler.

Since 1949 there has been a strong movement in progress among the European communities in the Rhodesias for federation of their two territories and Nyasaland. But Southern Rhodesia is a self-governing colony, virtually uncontrolled by Lon-

don, where power is in the hands of the 140,000 European settlers—Africa's largest white enclave outside the neighboring Union of South Africa. Sovereignty in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the other hand, resides in Britain's Parliament, which means that native policy is formulated by the Colonial Office.

Southern Rhodesia's policy toward the African is considerably more liberal than that of South Africa, but still regards communal equality as a century away. Africans in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia fear that federation will draw them inexorably into the world of white man's rule.

But the British government and white settlers in the Rhodesias have tried worthily to overcome this hurdle. After many consultations a draft constitution including careful safeguards for African rights was drafted early this year. It was approved by the Southern Rhodesian electorate in a plebiscite in April by a two-to-one vote, and it appears likely that it will go into effect despite continuing African objections.

In one respect, the orderly debate on Central African federation has had an effect similar to the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya and other events across the continent. It has stimulated African political consciousness and thus stirred the seeds of nationalism in a new area.

(Mr. Wade, former editor of the *Headline Series* and a contributor to the *Foreign Policy Bulletin* on British and Commonwealth developments, is now engaged in public relations work.)

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Reorganization in Washington

Those patient Americans who have followed the organizational history of the Departments of Defense and of State since the end of World War II, realize that final decisions about what is best in public administration never come. The fact that the administrative planner's work is never done has been made clear anew by the succession of proposals which President Eisenhower this spring sent to Congress for the reorganization once more of Defense and State, with incidental effects on the Mutual Security Administration.

In searching out the explanation for organizational changeableness, the first point that comes to mind is indecision in high policy matters. Can one expect administrative continuity without continuity of policy?

For example, uncertainty whether foreign or military policy comes first is once more evident in Washington. The difference in the approach to military problems by the Democratic Administration in its final period and the new Republican Administration is made clear by a comparison of the Truman and Eisenhower recommendations for the 1954 military budget. President Truman proposed a new expenditure of \$40.3 billion, with \$12.1 billion for the Army, \$11.4 billion for the Navy and \$16.8 billion for the Air Force. President Eisenhower proposes \$35.1 billion in new expenditures, with \$13.7 billion for the Army, \$9.7 billion for the Navy and \$11.7 billion for the Air Force.

In justifying the reduction, President Eisenhower conveyed the impression that his aim is to inaugurate a long-range, continuing policy to meet the continuing security crisis of

this era. Thus military policy would be adapted to the domestic policy of economy introduced by the new Administration, rather than to foreign policy, and the organization of the Defense Department must be changed accordingly.

Another factor in the instability of organizational arrangements is the changing character of political relationships.

In 1948, for example, the prevailing opinion at the Capitol was that the proposed Economic Cooperation Administration, about to be set up to run the Marshall plan, should be an independent agency, responsible directly to the President and not within the administrative jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. In that year Congress was controlled by the Republican party, while the presidency was held by the Democrats.

Politics and Administration

The Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, was then an office-holder in a Democratic Administration, and the "plan" to which his name was popularly attached had been worked out on a bipartisan basis. To underscore his belief that the program should forever be above politics, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican of Michigan, then chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, advocated the creation of a separate agency. The Brookings Institution supported this point of view in a report which found that the separation of the spending organ and the policy-making organ, the State Department, would be administratively sound. Senator Vandenberg had a candidate to head the ECA, Paul G. Hoffman,

and the Senator did not want this candidate subordinated to the Secretary of State or any other officer below the rank of the President.

In view of those considerations, which had little to do with the question of public administration itself, ECA and its successor, the Mutual Security Administration, have been independent agencies for more than five years. Now the MSA would have to surrender this independence.

In the seventh reorganization plan which he has submitted to Congress since he assumed office on January 20, the President recommended a changed status for MSA. The plan combines the foreign aid responsibilities of the State Department (Point Four, mainly) with those of the MSA. The responsibilities of the latter are being reduced by the President and Congress, neither of whom favors appropriations for foreign aid this year as large as last year and the years before. The plan kills the title Mutual Security Administration and substitutes the Foreign Operations Administration. FOA will be under the direct policy supervision of the Secretary of State provided Congress does not vote by August 1 against putting the plan into effect. Congress already has given the President blanket authority to reorganize the Executive Branch as he sees fit. He is required only to inform Congress of his intentions and to refrain from carrying them out if a majority of Congress objects. Thus he does not need a positive act on the part of the national legislature to reorganize MSA out of existence or change any other agency responsible to him.

Why was State Department super-

(Continued on page 8)



Neither Munich Nor Armageddon

The news over the week end of June 7 that the long-sought truce might soon bring the three-year Korean war to an end was bound to have a mixed reception in the non-Communist sector of the world.

Some, agreeing with Dr. Syngman Rhee, president of the Republic of Korea, felt that any settlement short of the reunification of Korea, no matter what the cost in lives, represented a surrender comparable to Munich which would merely pave the way to a third world war. Others heartily agreed with President Dwight D. Eisenhower's letter of June 7 to Dr. Rhee, in which the President declared that the armistice proposed by the enemy "involves a clear abandonment of the fruits of aggression," and that under the circumstances the United Nations "would not be justified in prolonging the war with all the misery that it involves in the hope of achieving, by force, the unification of Korea." The President reaffirmed the desire of the United States to see Korea united, but said that "we do not intend to employ war as an instrument to accomplish the world-wide political settlements to which we are dedicated and which we believe to be just."

In urging Dr. Rhee not to continue the war once the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists had withdrawn north of the 38th Parallel, the President, rejecting the advice of those who had advocated drastic measures against mainland China even at the risk of war with the U.S.S.R., chose to steer a middle course. The sufferings and anxieties borne by thousands of American families with men who served in

Korea, and the sense of frustration experienced by the American public at large, should not blind us to the historic decision the United States made in June 1950 when, instead of going unilaterally to the aid of the Republic of Korea, it placed American forces under the aegis of the United Nations on behalf of collective security. This decision marked a milestone both in American foreign policy and in mankind's arduous efforts since World War I to create an international community capable of defending itself against aggression.

Peaceful Change

The objective for which the United Nations entered the lists was to defend South Korea from attack, not to alter by force the political balance of power in the Far East which had emerged in the wake of World War II, as Communist China and Russia had hoped to do by their armed intervention in Korea. Changes in this balance are desired by both sides in the conflict. Ample opportunities for negotiating changes will be offered by the three-power Bermuda conference, by the Far Eastern conference which must be held within ninety days following the truce to discuss the political problems of Korea, "etc.," and by the possible four-power meeting which Sir Winston Churchill, backed by the Commonwealth chiefs who conferred with him in London after the Coronation, may now be expected to urge with added vigor.

Disturbing as Dr. Rhee's opposition to the conclusion of a truce has proved for the United States, two aspects of South Korea's situation must

not be overlooked. First, as long as Communist Chinese forces remain on Korean soil, Seoul will feel an understandable anxiety about the future. Yet, as the South Koreans are the first to admit, it is impossible to expect the withdrawal of the Chinese Communists unless the non-Korean forces of the United Nations are also withdrawn. Second, South Korea, like all small nations, finds it difficult to avoid the suspicion, nurtured by many decades of foreign intervention and control, that its interests will be sacrificed by the great powers. This suspicion will need to be dispelled.

In international relations, as in all relations between human beings, demands for change are bound to arise at one time or another as circumstances alter, as national aspirations become transformed and new opportunities arise. The important thing is not to avoid all change. That is impossible, as Metternich and other supporters of the *status quo* discovered through the ages. The vain hope of some of the Western powers in 1939 that without any sacrifice on their part Germany, Italy and Japan could somehow be made to accept the *status quo* created an atmosphere of false illusions which made Munich seem the only alternative to a military showdown for which Britain, France and the United States were then unprepared. The important thing is to make sure that change, when it comes, is achieved, not by force, but by peaceful means and with due regard for the interests of all nations affected. The process of peaceful change ultimately offers an alternative to Armageddon.

VERA MICHELES DEAN



Why Malan Won in South Africa

by Gwendolen M. Carter

Professor Carter, chairman of the Department of Government, Smith College, is the author of *The British Commonwealth and International Security: The Role of the Dominions, 1919-1939* (Toronto, Ryerson, 1947), and "Constitutional Crisis in South Africa," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, June 1, 1952. She is completing a year's study of the South African party system under a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation while on leave from Smith College.

JOHANNESBURG—When Dr. Daniel F. Malan's National party won the most bitterly contested of South African elections on April 15, his victory represented the triumph of militant Afrikaner nationalism.

It is true that, as in the 1948 election, the Nationalists polled a minority of the votes and only gained their commanding lead of 29 seats in the House of Assembly because the delimitation of constituencies favored them, particularly in the overweighting of rural votes. Yet if due allowance is made for the 20 uncontested seats, the Nationalists polled 210,000 more votes in 1953 than in 1948, whereas the United Front, with a far greater effort than it made in 1948, succeeded in increasing its total only by 140,000 votes. Thus the 1953 election indicated a Nationalist trend in South Africa and, in this sense, an endorsement of the leadership of that section of the South African community and of its rigid policies of *apartheid*, i.e., racial segregation of Europeans and non-Europeans.

The Two Parties

To understand both the reasons for and significance of this fact—which many South Africans feel will drastically, perhaps even permanently, affect the character of their country—it is necessary to know the basis and policies of South Africa's two major parties: the National party and the United party. The latter reflects the bi-racial character of South Africa's Europeans, including practically all the English-speaking (about one million of South Africa's 2.5 million

whites) and also a considerable number of the majority Afrikaners (who are descended from early Dutch, German and Huguenot French settlers). It is the great hope of those who believe—as did Botha, Smuts, and especially after 1933, Hertzog—that the country must be built on the tradition of both English and Afrikaner. But the weakness of the United party—as also its strength—is that it unites such a wide variety of groups: not only English- and Afrikaans-speaking, but also liberals and conservatives; Christians and Jews; industrialists and agriculturalists.

This diversity of support has made it difficult for the United party to develop clear-cut policies, particularly with regard to the numerically dominant Africans. Moreover, the party has always stood for empirical, rather than doctrinaire, methods, and depended on its leaders to enunciate its policies in terms of given circumstances. Since the death of General Jan Christiaan Smuts in 1950, the United party has had no dominant figure around which to rally, although it is developing a promising group of younger men. Thus, despite a generous "bread and butter" platform and a highly efficient organization operating in the last few weeks of the election period which was noticeably successful in bringing United party supporters to the polls, the party lacked the positive unified program and proselytizing zeal that might have won it a wide range of new adherents.

In contrast to the divergent groups

and loose bonds of the United party, the National party is a closely knit and highly disciplined body, with a constantly operating network of voluntary workers who are devoted to the cause of nationalism and are skillfully directed by a professional staff of ardent young organizers. At the same time, the remarkable sense of cohesion of the party stems from something much deeper, which is partly emotional and partly rooted in history.

Emotional Factors

Although the Malanites broke with General J. B. M. Hertzog, the traditional leader of Afrikaner nationalism, when the latter entered fusion with General Smuts in 1934, and subsequently found it impossible to re-establish unity with him when he, in turn, broke with General Smuts over South Africa's entrance into the war in 1939, the present Nationalist party maintains that it is the true standard bearer of Afrikaner nationalism. Thus it calls to its support the memory of the grievances of British imperialism in the nineteenth century which culminated in the Anglo-Boer war; the concentration camps for women and children during that war; the experiences of defeat; the way in which their spoken language, Afrikaans, was discriminated against until the 1920's; and the long uphill struggle to bring the Afrikaner to his present substantial economic position. Most Afrikaners now point with pride to their flourishing language and literature, and to the share their people take in the professions,

industry and commerce, no longer only in farming.

But not only is it still easy to arouse emotional response to the past; a surprising degree of insecurity also seems to linger on. Thus a slogan of "consolidate our gains" remains effective.

In another way, the Nationalist Afrikaner, especially of the *platte-land*, is conditioned by his past. His ancestors of the Great Trek, and thereafter, were moulded by the isolation in which they lived; by their struggles with the natives who poured in from the north as the Afrikaner was moving up from the south; and by their rigid and uncompromising Calvinism with its strong overtones of authoritarianism. All these are still potent factors in his attitudes today, partly because tradition retains a powerful hold in the country districts, and partly because most of what he reads springs from these roots.

Nationalists Close-Knit

Finally, every institution in the Nationalist Afrikaner community contributes toward the unity of the whole. The Nationalist party is the political spokesman; economic associations for aiding Afrikaners include the *Reddingsdaadbond*, which gives advice and makes contacts, and the *Volkskas*, which is a commercial bank; a wide group of societies, coordinated by the F.A.K. (*Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurvereniginge*), perform the same mission in the cultural sphere. There is also the *Broederbond*, variously interpreted as the central directing agency of Afrikaner nationalism or as a cultural society. The very secrecy of its membership and actions tends to promote rumors about its activities, but it may well be that it is now no more than the Nationalists say: a body of people who hold key positions in every sphere of

life (most of the Nationalist cabinet, including the prime minister, and perhaps half the Nationalist members of Parliament are *Broers*), and who work together to promote their own conception of South Africanism.

What is chiefly important is the general unity of purpose of all these groups, and their continuous and intimate contact with the Dutch Reformed Church, the Nationalist-inclined schools, and the Nationalist press. Many people belong, or have belonged, to several, or almost all, of these groups: Dr. Malan, for example, was a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church and subsequently the first editor of *Die Burger*, the most outstanding of the Nationalist newspapers. When the Nationalist party claims to speak for nationalist Afrikanerdom, it does so with a double justification: its political leaders are closely in touch with people in every sphere of Nationalist activity, and, in addition, the party is followed with almost blind fervor by its adherents just because it is the political organ of their faith.

The two major parties are divided not only according to racial composition and historical tradition, but also to a considerable extent along economic and geographical lines. The United party has a permanent basis of support in the most prominent business, commercial, industrial and mining interests, and in the elections its strength lay in the cities (where 18 constituencies were left unopposed by the Nationalists), and in English-speaking Natal. The National party, by contrast, depends mainly on the rural areas (outside Natal) which are heavily over-represented in constituency delimitations, as has been said; and on the semiskilled Europeans who work on the railways, in the mines and publicly-owned industries like Iscor (iron and steel), and in lower administrative jobs. Thus

the party returned to power not only embodies a fervent Afrikaner nationalism, fed by a strong sense of the destiny of its people, but also represents the lower income groups which feel most acutely the economic competition of the non-Europeans, and strongly support policies aimed at keeping the latter in restraint.

Issues at Stake

Thus, despite the hopes of the United party, the economic inducements it offered proved less attractive than the Nationalists' reiteration of their program of *apartheid*. Dr. Malan campaigned on the past achievements of his party—notably the Group Areas Act, under which any area of the country can be designated as being for the exclusive occupancy of any of the Union's racial groups, that is, Europeans, Colored (mixed blood), Indians, or Bantu; and the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act imposing heavy penalties for intercourse between races—and on three closely interrelated issues: the extension of *apartheid*, the sovereignty of Parliament and the threat of communism.

Under the second issue, he sought a mandate to take the Colored voters off the common roll in Cape Province (thus making political *apartheid* complete), although the Appeal Court has declared that the entrenched clauses of the constitution forbid such action without a two-thirds majority of the Senate and Assembly in joint session,* which the Nationalists cannot yet muster. Communism, Dr. Malan declared, was behind the native riots in three of the Union's chief cities last year—an assertion for which there is little evidence but which provokes fear in most European South Africans. But

* See Gwendolen M. Carter, "Constitutional Crisis in South Africa," *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, June 1, 1952.

perhaps most effective of all was the conviction that the National party would "keep the native in his place," and maintain order in this tangled racial situation with ruthless efficiency. Not without reason was it said that the Mau Mau outbreaks in Kenya were the strongest propaganda for the National party.

Prospects for the Future

What are the results of the Nationalist victory? Already there are signs that many in English-speaking Natal are thinking in terms of a new political party which will stand for the letter of the constitution and for the English tradition in South Africa in the same way as the Nationalists claim to represent the Afrikaner tradition. Natal has a long history of separate parties, and the United party has but shallow roots there. The earlier wave of secessionist sentiment, which sprang into being under the impetus of the Torch Commando's protests against violation of the entrenched clauses, can hardly be revived because of Natal's lack of economic self-sufficiency, but political separatism would not be unexpected. The 11 United party members from Natal are loyal to their party but their ability to speak for their province would be seriously undercut by such a development.

Another group deeply concerned by the failure of the United party to make a better showing in the election is the small, but very sincere, group of 10 or 12 liberals within its parliamentary ranks. Like the other anti-Nationalist forces in South Africa—i.e. the Torch Commando, an association predominantly composed of ex-servicemen which sprang into existence in 1951 to defend the constitution, and the small Labor party which has an intellectual basis of support—the liberals supported the United party in the 1953 election as

the only effective opposition to the National party. Many of them feel now, however, that it may be better to stand openly for the advancement of African rights, including a vote on the common roll for those who can meet high educational and property qualifications. Such a program would never bring them electoral success because of the fear of the white minority that it may ultimately be swamped by the Africans who outnumber them by more than four to one. Nevertheless, the liberals feel that open enunciation of their views may gradually ameliorate the position of the African, or at least persuade him of the good intentions of some Europeans.

It is about the African, of course, that there is most uncertainty. The Nationalists believe, and sincerely, that their policies of strict residential segregation, a rigid color bar in industry, a complete and permanent exclusion from voting with Europeans on the common roll, and harsh repressive measures in case of native outbreaks offer the best hope of maintaining peace and order. No official spokesman now talks of total *apartheid*, i.e. of sending all the natives back to the reserves; on the contrary, during the Nationalists' period of office more Africans have been absorbed into industry than ever before. But the Nationalists are determined that this process must be accompanied by measures which maintain white dominance in every sphere.

Whether they are right or wrong, it is clear that these are the policies which will be followed in the foreseeable future in South Africa, for Nationalist dominance in political life is likely to be of long duration. If, however, they are wrong, as most of the liberally inclined Europeans in the Union and almost all the educated non-Europeans maintain, then

South Africa faces a tragic period of intensified racial strain, which may well lead to sporadic, if not nationwide, outbreaks of violence.

The most unhappy feature of South African life today is that an understandable Afrikaner nationalism is acting in such a way as to incite counter-nationalisms among both the English-speaking in the Union and, more seriously, the non-Europeans. So far, there are few signs on the part of the Nationalists of the understanding or conciliation which an outside observer feels offers the only hope in what is, in fact, the world's most complex racial situation.

READING SUGGESTIONS: Basil Davidson, *Report on Southern Africa* (London, Jonathan Cape, 1952); Eugene P. Dvorin, *Racial Separation in South Africa* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952); C. W. M. Gell, "Hard Choices in South Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1953; John Hatch, *The Dilemma of South Africa* (London, Dennis Dobson, 1952); E. S. Sachs, *The Choice Before South Africa* (London, Turnstile Press, 1952); Leo Marquard, *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1952).

As Others See Us

Raymond Aron, a firm supporter of the Atlantic alliance who does not believe that any fundamental change in the world situation has occurred as a result of Stalin's death, nevertheless contended early in May in *Le Figaro* that the West must decide whether or not it is willing to negotiate with Moscow. "It will be objected," he wrote, "that it is too early to decide, that the intentions of Stalin's successors are still obscure, and that it is better first to ratify the pending agreements. There is certainly something to be said for this tactic, which appears to have been adopted by American leaders. Yet it seems to me to involve many risks. By replying to Soviet gestures with propaganda one facilitates the Soviet maneuver."

Newsletter

(Continued from page 3)

vision of foreign aid unsound in 1948 but sound in 1953? One factor is the declining importance of MSA as its financial appropriation declines. Another factor is the readiness of a Republican Congress to trust the State Department of a Republican Administration more completely than an earlier Republican Congress was willing or able to trust the State Department of a Democratic Administration. A third factor is the decline of bipartisanship. The new orientation of foreign aid toward Asia represents the wishes of the majority party rather than a conclusion that might follow inter-party discussion.

When the agencies of economic power have been inside the State Department, the complaint has been heard that they clutter up the task of decision-making. The counter-complaint is that when they are outside the department their leading officials at home and abroad make their own decisions without consideration for what the State Department has decided. For several years State Department and Foreign Service officers have objected that from time to time MSA officials in foreign posts have competed with Ambassadors instead of cooperating with them. The resulting confusion in policy might

have led to the merger now proposed no matter what party's candidate had been elected President last fall.

A final item in the list of forces that contribute to organizational changeableness in Washington is the failure thus far to determine the exact relationship between a modern phenomenon like international communication and an ancient political art like diplomacy.

What Kind of Information?

The same war that produced the problem of economic power for the State Department produced the problem of communication. Repeated acts of Congress during the past 12 years make it clear that the point of agreement in this field is that the United States should provide information to the people of other countries, whether friendly or unfriendly. But it has never been decided whether this information is to be primarily news, like the content of many BBC overseas broadcasts, or explanation or exhortation or evangelizing. Officials are torn between the desire to propagandize and guilt at the thought of indulging, or being caught indulging, in propaganda. Nor has it been decided whether it is the task of the American informationist or propagandist to reflect the policy of the State Department and President, or to reflect the country as a whole, in

all its ramifications and noble contradictions. These uncertainties emerge in the administrative history of the information program.

During the war the Office of Facts and Figures and then the Office of War Information were independent. Since the war such agencies have been inside the State Department. In that period four successive Congresses have held long discussions and investigations of the best means of administering information. No Congress has been satisfied with the finding of its predecessor. Yet no Congress has come up with a radical idea. Administratively the locus of the information programs has gone unchanged since the end of the war carried it to the State Department, because of uncertainty whether change might not be for the worse. So under Reorganization Plan No. 8, which President Eisenhower submitted to Congress early in June, the State Department would retain ostensible control of the foreign information programs. This continuity about the organizational question cannot hide the fact that the questions of function and purpose of the programs are still unanswered.

BLAIR BOLLES

CORRECTION: In Blair Bolles' article of May 15, page 3, column 2, "Chief Justice Clark" should have read "Chief Justice Vinson."

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